Professor Thevaranjan’s research revolves around agency theory and organizational control. The main contribution of his research has been in extending the principal-agent framework to study issues pertaining to effort allocation.
"A Moral Solution to the Moral Hazard Problem," (2009), Accounting, Organizations and Society, with D. Stevens.
"Returns to Scale Pattern and Efficient Firm Size in the Public Accounting Industry: An Empirical Investigation," (2009), Journal of the Operational Research Society, with H. Chang and G. Galantine
"Investigating Pricing Solutions to Combat Spam," (2008), Journal of Interactive Marketing, with K. Joseph.
"Shielding of CEO Compensation from the Income-decreasing Effects of Strategic Expenditures," 2002, Contemporary Accounting Research
, Volume 19, No. 2, 175-193, (with Dura, A. and Iyenghar, R.)
"Monitoring and Incentives in Sales Organizations: An Agency Theoretic Perspective," 1998, Marketing Science
, 17(2): 107-123, (with Joseph, K.). Selected Publications
- "Product Line Extensions and the Redesign of Salesforce Compensation: A Principal-Agent Perspective", , 128
- "A Moral Solution to the Moral Hazard Problem", Accounting, Organizations and Society, forthcoming, (with Stevens, D.)